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The Association Between Believing
in Free Will and Subjective
Well-Being Is Confounded by a
Sense of Personal Control
Peter L. T. Gooding* , Mitchell J. Callan and Gethin Hughes
Department of Psychology, University of Essex, Essex, United Kingdom
The extent to which an individual believes in free will is associated with a number of
positive life outcomes, including their own subjective well-being. However, it is not
known whether the belief that one has free will per se is uniquely associated with
subjective well-being over and above potential confounding variables. We examined a
sense of personal control as one such confound—specifically, whether the association
between free will belief (FWB) and subjective well-being is based, in part, on the degree
to which an individual feels a sense of personal control over their life. In Study, 1 trait-level
belief in personal control significantly uniquely predicted satisfaction with life and stress,
over and above the contribution of FWB. In Study 2, within-person daily fluctuations in
stress and depression were not significantly predicted by daily changes in FWB over
and above the contribution of personal control/choice. The findings provide new insight
into the relationship between FWB and subjective well-being.
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INTRODUCTION
A growing body of evidence has shown that believing in free will is associated with a variety of
positive life outcomes, including feeling grateful for past events (MacKenzie et al., 2014), better job
performance (Stillman et al., 2010), higher academic achievement (Feldman et al., 2016), passionate
love (Boudesseul et al., 2016), satisfaction with life (Li et al., 2017), and lower levels of perceived
stress (Crescioni et al., 2015).
Nonetheless, the extent to which belief in free will per se is associated with positive life outcomes
or whether some third variable is driving these associations remains to be explored. One possibility
is that the relationship between free will beliefs (FWBs) and positive life outcomes, such as
satisfaction with one’s life, might be confounded by a sense of personal control. Indeed, it is
well-established that a sense of personal control is positively associated with many of the same
positive life outcomes that relate to FWB, including subjective well-being (for reviews, see Myers
and Diener, 1995; Peterson, 1999; Ross and Mirowsky, 2013). Thus, it is unclear whether FWB
are uniquely associated with indicators of subjective well-being over and above a sense of personal
control.
In their work exploring lay understandings of free will, Monroe and Malle (2010, 2014)
found that people’s definitions of what it means to have free will differed from philosophical
understandings that typically view free will as the ability for our conscious minds (or a soul)
to make decisions, regardless of brain states or prior causal events (Harris, 2012). Rather,
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people defined free will as their freedom to make choices and the
ability to act without constraints—that is, their sense of personal
control (see also Baumeister and Monroe, 2014). Thus, insofar
that our participants’ lay concepts of FWB are specifically tied
to having a sense of personal control, then individual differences
in a sense of personal control might better predict subjective
well-being than individual differences in FWB. Consistent with
this idea, Monroe et al. (2017) found that people’s beliefs that
an agent who committed an immoral act had the capacity
to choose their actions better predicted judgments of their
blameworthiness than did their beliefs that the agent had free
will. We reasoned that the known association between FWB and
subjective well-being might be confounded by a sense of personal
control.
Across two studies, we compared the relative predictive utility
of perceived control/choice and FWB across various indicators
of subjective well-being. Study 1 investigated the degree to which
personal control and FWB uniquely predicted satisfaction with
life and perceived stress. Study 2 assessed how daily changes
in perceived choice/control and FWB predicted life stress and
depression across a 2-week period. Given the foregoing analysis,
we predicted that the known associations between FWB and
subjective well-being could be explained, in part, by people’s
perceived ability to have choice and to control their lives. In
Study 2 we also assessed participants’ qualitative definitions of
free will, to investigate whether they fit with previously reported
lay conceptions of FWB (cf. Monroe and Malle, 2010).
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
Participants from the United States were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N = 284). Demographic information
was not collected (but see Levay et al., 2016, for information
on the typical demographic composition of Mechanical Turk
workers). Nineteen additional participants were excluded
because of duplicate IP addresses (n = 6) or failing a basic
attention check item (n = 13). A power analysis showed that our
sample size had 80% power to detect “small-to-medium” effect
sizes (f 2 = 0.028; α = 0.05, two-tailed) in our multiple regression
analysis.
Procedure and Materials
Participants were instructed that they would complete a survey
about their beliefs and opinions. We measured participants’ belief
in free will using a single-item, graphical slider scale (“Using the
slider provided, please indicate the extent to which you believe
in free will”). The scale ranged from 0 (no belief in free will) to
100 (absolute belief in free will), and the starting position of the
slider was set to the mid-point of the scale. This measure has
been shown to have good convergent (Schooler et al., 2014) and
predictive (e.g., Feldman et al., 2016) validity, and single-item free
will measures have been shown to be sensitive to experimental
manipulations of FWBs (MacKenzie et al., 2014; Nahmias et al.,
2014; Monroe et al., 2017).
Participants’ sense of personal control was gauged using a
five-item measure (e.g., “Other people determine most of what I
can and cannot do”; “There is little I can do to change many of the
important things in my life”; “I can do just about anything I really
set my mind to”; Chou et al., 2016, adapted from Lachman and
Weaver, 1998). Participants indicated their level of agreement
on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree). Higher scores indicate a greater sense of personal
control.
Participants’ perceived stress was measured using two items:
“In the past year, how would you rate the amount of stress in
your life (at home and at work)?” (1 = no stress to 6 = extreme
stress; Littman et al., 2006) and “Stress means a situation in
which a person feels tense, restless, nervous, or anxious or is
unable to sleep at night because his/her mind is troubled all
the time. Do you feel this kind of stress these days?” (1 = not
at all to 6 = very much; Elo et al., 2003). Responses to the
two items were highly correlated (r = 0.73, p < 0.001) and
therefore averaged to form a composite measure of perceived
stress.
Participants’ life satisfaction was measured using Diener et al.
(1985) widely used Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS), which
is comprised of five items (e.g., “In most ways my life is close
to my ideal”; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Alpha
reliabilities for all measures with more than one item are shown
in Table 1.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities, and
correlations among the measures. All of the measures correlated
significantly in the expected directions. FWB positively correlated
with sense of personal control, and both correlated positively with
SWL and negatively with perceived stress.
A multiple regression analysis showed that sense of personal
control, b = 0.85, β = 0.49, SE = 0.098, t(281) = 8.65, p < 0.001,
sr2 = 0.20, but not FWB, b = 0.003, β = 0.05, SE = 0.004,
t(281) = 0.81, p = 0.42, sr2 = 0.002, uniquely predicted scores
on the SWLS. Likewise, personal control, b = −0.67, β = −0.443,
SE = 0.090, t(281) = −7.42, p < 0.001, sr2 = 0.20, but not FWB,
b = 0.003, β = 0.04, SE = 0.004, t(281) = 0.73, p = 0.46, sr2 = 0.002,
uniquely predicted perceived stress.
Because confounding relationships are a special case of
indirect relationships (MacKinnon et al., 2000), we tested
whether there was a significant decrease in the regression weight
for FWB when modeled with a sense of personal control
to predict each of SWL and perceived stress compared to
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and correlations among measures in Study 1.
Measures Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4
(1) FWB 82.52 (19.57) –
(2) Control 3.82 (0.83) 0.426∗∗ (0.83)
(3) SWLS 4.20 (1.44) 0.254∗∗ 0.510∗∗ (0.97)
(4) Stress 3.61 (1.25) −0.145∗ −0.424∗∗ −0.409∗∗ (0.83)
SWLS, the Satisfaction With Life Scale. When applicable, alpha reliabilities are
presented in parentheses along the diagonal. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
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when FWB was modeled alone. Using Preacher and Hayes’s
(2008) bootstrapping procedure for testing indirect effects
(10,000 resamples for each analysis), the relationships between
FWB and SWL (indirect relationship = 0.015, β = 0.21, 95%
bias-corrected and accelerated confidence interval: 0.011, 0.022)
and FWB and perceived stress (indirect relationship = −0.012,
β = −0.19, 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence
interval: −0.017, −0.008) were significantly reduced from their
zero-order validities when statistically controlling for a sense of
personal control.
These results suggest that the associations between FWB
and SWL and FWB and perceived stress are largely due to
co-variation between FWB and a sense of personal control. One
limitation, however, is that our multiple regression approach fails
to take measurement unreliability into account, which Westfall
and Yarkoni (2016) showed can lead to spurious conclusions
when testing for incremental validity. To address this issue,
we replicated our results using structural equation modeling.
Specifically, using the lavaan package in R (Rosseel, 2012),
we specified measurement models for each predictor (sense of
personal control and FWB) and each outcome to predict the
latent outcome variables (separately for SWL and perceived
stress) from the latent predictor variables. Because FWB was
measured by a single indicator and therefore reliability could
not be estimated empirically, we had to constrain the reliability
of the FWB slider scores in our models. Following Westfall and
Yarkoni’s (2016) recommendation, we tested a range of assumed
reliabilities for our FWB measure (from 0.2 to 1 in increments of
0.2). Assuming the reliability for the FWB scores was as low as 0.4
(models failed to converge when the reliability of the FWB scores
was assumed to be 0.2), analyses showed that a sense of personal
control significantly predicted both SWL, Z = 3.99, p < 0.001,
and perceived stress, Z = −3.88, p< 0.001, over and above FWB.
In no case did FWB significantly predict the outcome variables
over and above the contributions of sense of personal control (all
ps > 0.13; the partial relationship between FWB and stress tended
to become more positive when we assumed lower reliability for
FWB scores).
STUDY 2
Method
Participants
The final sample of participants were 88 staff or students from
the University of Essex (Mage = 24.18, SDage = 6.50; 77% female)
who participated in exchange for a monetary reward (£1 for an
initial session and £1 for every daily diary completed) and the
chance to win gift cards. Two additional participants completed
measures during an initial session but did not complete any of
our focal daily measures. The final sample size was determined
by how many participants we could recruit within our monetary
budget and time constraints.
Procedure and Measures
Participants attended an initial laboratory session where they
completed a variety of measures unrelated to the current project.
Of relevance here, during this initial session participants were
asked to respond to an open-ended question about their FWBs:
“Please explain what you think it means to have free will”
(Monroe and Malle, 2010). Responses to this question were coded
by two raters using Monroe and Malle’s (2010) original coding
scheme. We included this question to replicate Monroe and
Malle’s (2010) findings surrounding what “free will” means to
people.
At the end of the initial session, participants were informed
that they would receive daily emails including a link to a 10-
min survey. The daily surveys were emailed to participants
every day for 14 days at 5:00 PM; they had until 3:00 AM to
complete the daily surveys. Participants who failed to complete
more than five daily surveys were removed from the study (i.e.,
no longer sent the email links), but all data from participants
who completed at least one daily survey were retained for
analysis. Along with several questions unrelated to the current
research interests, participants completed the following daily
measures:
We measured participants’ daily FWB using a single-item,
graphical slider scale (“Using the slider provided, please indicate
the extent to which you believed you had free will today”). The
scale ranged from 0 (no belief in free will today) to 100 (absolute
belief in free will today).
We measured participants’ sense that they controlled their
actions and were free to choose that day using single-item,
graphical slider scales (“Using the slider provided, please indicate
the extent to which you believed you were in control of your
actions today”; “. . .you were free to choose whatever you wanted
to do today”). Scores could range from 0 (no control/no choice at
all today) to 100 (complete control/complete choice today). Scores
on these two daily measures were averaged to form a composite
control/choice variable (within-person reliability = 0.54; see
Nezlek, 2017).
As our focal criterion variables, we measured participants’
daily stress (“Today, I felt stressed”) and daily depression
(“Today, I felt depressed”) using four-point scales (1 = not at all,
4 = very much). Depression is an element of the unpleasant affect
component of subjective well-being (Diener et al., 1999).
Results and Discussion
Lay Definitions of Free Will
We coded participants’ open-ended responses using Monroe
and Malle’s (2010) coding scheme. Specifically, we coded the
responses the question “Please explain what you think it means
to have free will” in terms of whether participants noted: (a)
making decision or choices, (b) doing what they want, and (c)
acting without internal or external constraints. Shown in Table 2,
consistent with Monroe and Malle (2010, 2014), the majority
of participants’ definitions of free will referred to the ability
to decide/choose, doing what one wants, and/or being free of
constraints. During the coding and analysis it was also clear
that none of our participants defined free will as reliant upon
notions of indeterminism, magical causation or other qualities
needed for the type of free will debated by philosophers (see
Monroe and Malle, 2010; Baumeister and Monroe, 2014, for
discussions).
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Daily Stress and Depression
Given the nested structure of the data (daily responses nested
within participants), analyses were performed using multilevel
modeling (Nezlek, 2012). Analyses were performed using the
lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) in R, with maximal but
uncorrelated random effects (i.e., random slopes and intercepts
TABLE 2 | Content coding of the folk definitions of free will.
Coding category Percentage
coder
agreement
Kappa of
agreement
Percentage of
participants
mentioning
the category
Ability to make a
decision/choice
91 0.81 64
Doing what you
want
84 0.69 50
Acting without
constraints
87 0.72 69
Definitions of coding categories were taken from Monroe and Malle (2010).
by participants; including correlations among the random effects
led to problems with convergence; Barr et al., 2013). All
predictors were person-centered to control for between-person
variance in the predictors. We did not model time (days) because
we had no theoretical reason to expect time to influence daily
changes in stress or depression across the 14-days.
On average participants completed 10.74 (SD = 3.75) of the 14
daily surveys (range = 13; total daily surveys completed = 944).
TABLE 3 | Means, standard deviations, and proportion of variance in the
predictors and outcome variables at the within- and between-person levels.
Measures M SD
Between Within
Choice/control 75.99 17.06 (60%) 13.84 (40%)
FWB 75.49 20.75 (61%) 16.73 (39%)
Stress 2.28 0.63 (38%) 0.79 (62%)
Depression 1.82 0.64 (44%) 0.72 (56%)
TABLE 4 | Linear mixed effects models predicting daily stress and daily depression from daily FWB and daily choice/control (alone and with both simultaneously).
Daily FWB Daily choice/control
b SE Wald 95% CI b SE Wald 95% CI
Daily stress
FWB alone −0.007∗ 0.002 [−0.012, −0.002] – – –
Choice alone – – – −0.010∗ 0.003 [−0.015, −0.004]
FWB and choice −0.002 0.002 [−0.006, 0.002] −0.009∗ 0.003 [−0.014, −0.003]
Daily depression
FWB alone −0.008∗ 0.003 [−0.013, −0.003] – – –
Choice alone – – – −0.011∗ 0.003 [−0.017, −0.007]
FWB and choice −0.002 −0.002 [−0.007, 0.002] −0.01∗ 0.003 [−0.016, −0.005]
FWB, free will belief. ∗p < 0.05 (based on the Wald 95% confidence interval not containing zero).
FIGURE 1 | Mean levels of the two main predictor variables (combined choice/control and free will beliefs) and the two criterion variables (stress and depression)
across days. Stress and depression have been rescaled (from 1–4 to 0–100) for illustration.
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Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and the proportion of variance
at the within- and between-person levels for each of the measures
we employed.
As expected, daily fluctuations in choice/control were
significantly associated with daily fluctuations in participants’
FWB, b = 0.51, SE = 0.07 (95% Wald confidence interval [CI]:
0.38, 0.65; here, FWB was the outcome variable in the analysis).
Shown in Table 4, both daily FWBs and daily choice/control
beliefs significantly predicted daily fluctuations in stress and
depression when modeled alone. However, when daily FWBs
and daily choice/control were modeled together to predict daily
stress and depression, only daily choice/control emerged as a
significant predictor. Put differently, at the within-person level,
daily changes in FWBs did not account for significant variability
in daily stress and depression over and above the contributions
of daily changes in choice/control. Figure 1 shows the means of
FWB, choice/control, stress, and depression across the 14 days.
Like in Study 1, we tested whether there was a significant
decrease in the regression weight for daily FWB when modeled
with daily choice/control to predict each of daily stress and daily
depression compared to when FWB was modeled alone. We used
Rockwood and Hayes’s (2017; see Zhang et al., 2009) MLmed
SPSS macro for multilevel mediation to perform these analyses
(with 10,000 Monte Carlo samples). Analyses showed that the
relations between daily FWB and daily stress (within-subject
indirect relationship = −0.004, Z = −2.77, p = 0.006, 95% Monte
Carlo CI: −0.007, −0.001) and daily FWB and daily depression
(within-subject indirect relationship = −0.005, Z = −3.38,
p = 0.001, 95% Monte Carlo CI: −0.008, −0.002) were
significantly reduced from their zero-order relationships when
statistically controlling for a sense of personal control.
These findings are consistent with our trait-level findings
reported in Study 1: associations between participants’ subjective
well-being (in this case, daily stress and depression) and FWBs
appear to be due to the co-variation between FWB and beliefs
about having control and being able to choose.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across two studies we investigated the role of personal control
and choice in the relationship between FWB and subjective
well-being. Previous research has provided evidence for the
predictive value of FWB on such outcomes (e.g., Crescioni et al.,
2015). Here, we show that this association can be explained
by perceived control/choice. Study 1 showed that trait-level
belief in personal control significantly uniquely predicted SWL
and stress, whereas FWB did not. Study 2 confirmed that
within-person daily fluctuations in stress and depression are not
significantly predicted by daily changes in FWB over and above
the contribution of personal control/choice.
Previous research has shown that the association between
FWB and judgments of others’ morality/blame is due to perceived
capacity for choice (Monroe et al., 2017). The current studies
extend this by showing that like judgments of others’ behavior,
the relationship between FWB and personal life outcomes,
relevant to subjective well-being, is also due to co-variation with
control/choice. Crescioni et al. (2015) showed that although both
self-efficacy and locus of control were correlated with FWB, they
did not explain the association between FWB and life outcomes
(meaning in life and SWL). We chose to focus on measures of
control/choice that more closely reflected the nature of layperson
conceptions of free will (Monroe and Malle, 2010). Unlike
Monroe et al. (2017), who manipulated/measured choice using
vignettes, we used a self-report measure of the degree to which
participants believed in the ability to control their behavior or
have the capacity for choice. These measures effectively captured
the key elements of the lay concepts of free will to the extent that
they reduced the predictive utility of FWB on perceived stress and
depression.
Much recent research has investigated the role of FWBs in
a number of life outcomes, as well as psychological well-being.
Here, we provide evidence for the role of personal control/choice
in explaining why FWB predicts stress and depression. For
laypeople, belief in free will fundamentally means having the
capacity to make choices and control one’s life (Monroe and
Malle, 2010), and our Study 2 findings of participants’ definitions
of free will confirm this. This perception of personal control
appears to be protective of perceived stress and depression such
that individuals with strong belief in the degree to which they
control their lives may be less likely to negatively react to stressful
life events. We also provide further evidence for the role of
perceived control in stress and depression. This goes beyond
previous research, by utilizing measures of control/choice that are
closely aligned to high level beliefs in free will. Future research
should investigate the relative power of these different aspects of
choice in predicting stress and depression.
Although we show that the predictive utility of FWB on
personal life outcomes is abolished when controlling for personal
choice, it remains possible that FWB does have unique predictive
utility in other contexts. Indeed, the modest correlation between
FWB and personal control suggests that FWB and personal
control are not precisely the same thing. Nonetheless, recent work
(Monroe et al., 2017) shows that the relationship between FBW
and morality is similarly explained by notions of personal control.
As such future research should seek to determine which behaviors
or outcomes might be predicted by FWB over and above personal
control.
Further research should also attempt to identify the direction
of these relationships. For instance, much research on FWB
assumes that belief or disbelief in free will drives life outcomes
and personal well-being. However, while control beliefs influence
how someone copes with a stressful event, this coping also feeds
back into the individual’s sense of personal control (Anderson,
1977). As such, while belief in free will/choice may be protective
of subjective well-being, stressful life events may also lead to a
reduction in a sense of personal control.
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